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VIOLATING PRIVACY IN PRIVATE: HOW 
EPIC v. DHS CREATES AN IMPOSSIBLE 
BURDEN ON PLAINTIFFS TRYING TO 
DEMONSTRATE A PRIVACY ACT 
VIOLATION 
Abstract: On July 15, 2011, in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
held that to prove a violation of the Privacy Act, a plaintiff must show evi-
dence of specific conduct. Yet, the current system of Freedom of Informa-
tion Act exceptions and presumptions makes it exceedingly difficult for a 
plaintiff to gain access to evidence of specific conduct. Therefore, this 
Comment argues that these presumptions make it almost impossible for a 
plaintiff to discover and sue a defense agency for a Privacy Act violation, 
thereby leaving no realistic opportunity for relief to aggrieved parties. 
Introduction 
 In 2007, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began 
using Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) in body scanners at airport 
security checkpoints across the United States.1 When a person stands in 
a scanner using AIT, the machine generates an image of the individ-
ual’s naked body.2 That image is then used to ensure that the traveler is 
not trying to carry weapons or explosives onto an airplane.3 Due to the 
private nature of one’s naked body, many individuals have attempted to 
sue the government to prevent these scanners from being used.4 They 
have done so by claiming that use of AIT scanners constitutes an un-
constitutional search which unreasonably intrudes on individuals’ pri-
vacy.5 
 On July 15, 2011, in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security (EPIC II ), the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
                                                                                                                      
1 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (EPIC II ), 653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
2 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 44901(a), 44902(a)(1) (2007)). 
3 Id. (citing §§ 44901(a), 44902(a)(1)). 
4 See id.; Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9–12 (D.D.C. 2011); Redfern v. Na-
politano, No. 10-12048-DJC, 2011 WL 1750445, at *3–8 (D. Mass. May 9, 2011). 
5 See EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 3; Roberts, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 9–12; Redfern, 2011 WL 1750445, 
at *3–8. 
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the D.C. Circuit held that the TSA did not follow proper administrative 
procedures in employing these scanners.6 Nonetheless, the court held 
that the TSA’s use of AIT scanners did not violate the Privacy Act or 
constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.7 
 Part I of this Comment outlines the use of AIT and the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center’s (EPIC) suit against the TSA.8 Then, Part 
II explains the court’s reasoning in concluding that the use of AIT does 
not violate the Privacy Act.9 Finally, Part III argues that the presump-
tions for the government and the exceptions built into the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) prevent plaintiffs from obtaining sufficient 
evidence to sue defense agencies for Privacy Act violations.10 It further 
contends that these presumptions are so strong that it is almost impos-
sible for a plaintiff to engage in discovery and successfully sue a defense 
agency for a Privacy Act violation.11 
I. Background of EPIC v. DHS 
A. The Development and Use of AIT 
 After September 11, 2001, when terrorists used box cutters and 
small knives to hijack commercial planes and fly them into the World 
Trade Center Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washing-
ton, D.C., Congress passed expansive airline security legislation.12 This 
legislation made all airport screeners federal TSA employees within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).13 Furthermore, Congress 
required all commercial airline passengers to be screened by TSA 
agents to ensure that those passengers are not carrying weapons or ex-
plosives.14 In addition, Congress authorized the TSA to determine con-
fidential standard operating procedures for the screening process.15 
Congress also barred anyone who had not been screened by TSA 
                                                                                                                      
6 653 F.3d at 7–8. 
7 See id. at 10–11. 
8 See infra notes 12–54 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 55–74 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 75–91 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
12 See Aviation and Transportation of Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.6(a) (4th ed. 2010). 
13 Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
14 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 3 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 44901(a), 44902(a)(1) (2007)). 
15 Id. 
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agents from entering the “sterile area” of an airport, the area one en-
ters after passing through security.16 
 In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
Congress directed the TSA to prioritize the development of new tech-
nology that can test for nonmetallic, chemical, biological, and radio-
logical weapons in all forms.17 To achieve these ends, the TSA con-
tracted with private vendors to develop AIT.18 Vendors produced two 
different types of scanners: one that uses millimeter wave technology, 
which employs radio frequency energy, and one that uses backscatter 
technology, which employs low-intensity x-ray beams.19 Both scanners 
generate an image of an unclothed person, allowing the operator of 
the machine to search for nonmetallic objects without having to pat 
down a passenger.20 
 Although many passengers complain about being forced to un-
dergo AIT scans, the TSA contends that passengers are not required to 
submit to a scan.21 Instead, passengers may opt for a pat down, which 
the TSA claims is the only effective alternative method of screening 
passengers.22 Still, many passengers are unaware that the pat-down op-
tion exists.23 In addition, some passengers who have opted for a pat 
down complain that the resulting pat down was unnecessarily aggres-
sive.24 
 The TSA has taken steps to address concerns regarding passen-
gers’ privacy and safety.25 For example, each image produced by the 
scanner passes through a filter to obscure facial features and is only 
viewable by an officer on a computer screen in a remote and secure 
room.26 As soon as the passenger is cleared, the image is deleted.27 The 
officer cannot save the image, and no recording devices are allowed in 
the secure room.28 In addition, the TSA commissioned two studies that 
have concluded that the backscatter scanners emit levels of radiation 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1540.105(a)(2) (2003)). 
17 49 U.S.C. § 44925(a). 






24 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 3. 
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well within acceptable limits, even for frequent travelers.29 The millime-
ter wave scanners have also been tested to confirm that they meet ac-
cepted safety standards.30 
B. EPIC’s Suit Against the Government 
 In April and July of 2009, EPIC submitted two separate Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requests to DHS seeking information regard-
ing TSA’s use of AIT.31 In the first FOIA request, EPIC sought docu-
ments relating to the training and operation of these scanners and in-
formation about the scanners’ capabilities to store images.32 In its 
second request, EPIC sought uncensored images from these scanners, 
contracts relating to the use and manufacture of AIT, and complaints to 
the TSA about the use of AIT.33 
 In response to these requests, DHS produced 1766 pages of re-
sponsive documents, many of which were heavily redacted.34 DHS also 
withheld 2000 images produced by the body scanners and 376 pages of 
TSA training materials.35 According to the TSA, the withheld images 
portrayed various threat objects dispersed over the body and were 
meant to test the detection standards in the TSA’s procurement specifi-
cations.36 In addition, the TSA withheld the 376 pages of security train-
ing materials because they were created to train TSA employees who 
operate the body scanners.37 The TSA claimed that the release of these 
images and documents would threaten transportation security.38 
 On November 5, 2009, EPIC sued DHS for failing to respond to its 
first FOIA request in a timely manner.39 On January 13, 2010, EPIC 
again sued DHS for failing to respond to its second FOIA request in a 
timely manner.40 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
consolidated these suits, and on January 12, 2011 it held that a FOIA 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. 
30 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 4. 
31 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (EPIC I ), 760 F. Supp. 2d 4, 
7–8 (D.D.C.), motion for relief from judgment denied, 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
32 Id. at 8 n.2. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.; see FOIA Note #20 (Aug. 15, 2011): Government Transparency, Elec. Privacy Info. 
Ctr. (Aug. 15, 2011), http://epic.org/foia_notes/foia_note_20_august_15_2011.html. 
35 EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 8–9. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 Id. 
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exception permitted the TSA to withhold images and training materials 
from EPIC.41 
 In the meantime, more than thirty organizations, including EPIC, 
had sent a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security objecting to the 
use of AIT scanners as a primary means of screening passengers.42 They 
asked that the TSA cease using AIT in that capacity pending a ninety-
day formal public rulemaking process.43 The TSA responded with a 
letter, which addressed these organizations’ concerns, but ignored their 
request for a formal rulemaking process.44 
 In April of 2010, EPIC and a slightly different group of organiza-
tions sent a petition to the Secretary and Chief Privacy Officer of 
DHS.45 This petition was made under the Administrative Procedures 
Act, which allows “an interested person the right to petition for the is-
suance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”46 In this petition, the group 
argued that the use of AIT for primary screening violates the Privacy 
Act, as well as a variety of other statutes and Constitutional rights.47 In 
May of 2010, the TSA again responded by letter, clarifying some factual 
matters and defending its position that it is not required to initiate a 
rulemaking process each time it changes screening procedures.48 
 Other individuals and organizations, who were also concerned 
with the use of AIT, brought suit against the TSA.49 Those suits were 
unsuccessful, however, and the U.S. District Courts for the Districts of 
Columbia and Massachusetts dismissed claims against the TSA, holding 
that under the U.S. Code, the only court with original jurisdiction for 
challenges to the use of AIT scanners is the D.C. Circuit.50 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                      
41 EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 9, 13, 14. 
42 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 4; Letter from Am. Ass’n of Small Prop. Owners et al., to Janet 
Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (May 31, 2009), available at http://epic.org/ 
privacy/airtravel/backscatter/Napolitano_ltr-wbi-6–09.pdf. 
43 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 4. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; Letter from Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. et al., to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., and Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
(Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/petition_042110. 
pdf. 
46 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 4; see 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006). 
47 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 4. 
48 Id. 
49 See Roberts, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 9–12; Redfern, 2011 WL 1750445, at *3–8. 
50 See Roberts, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 9–12; Redfern, 2011 WL 1750445, at *3–8; see also 49 
U.S.C.A. § 46110(a) (West 2003) (providing that a person with a substantial interest in an 
order by the Secretary of Transportation may apply for review of the order by filling a peti-
tion in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit or the circuit in which the person 
resides or has its principal place of business). 
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EPIC, joined by two members of its advisory board who had traveled 
frequently and been subjected to AIT screening by the TSA, petitioned 
the D.C. Circuit for review.51 
 On July 15, 2011, the court held that the TSA’s adoption of AIT 
constituted a substantive legislative rule subjecting it to notice-and-
comment rulemaking requirements.52 Notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing would require the TSA to publish the new rule, take comments on 
it from interested parties, and then respond to those comments before 
implementing the new rule.53 In addition, the court held that AIT pro-
cedures did not violate the Privacy Act.54 
II. Reasoning Behind the D.C. Circuit’s Holding That the Use 
of AIT Does Not Violate the Privacy Act 
A. Record Keeping Practices Under the Privacy Act 
 The EPIC II court held that a violation of the Privacy Act requires 
specific evidence of violation—in this case, evidence of images stored 
on AIT scanners, not just evidence of the scanners’ capability to store 
images.55 Furthermore, the court held that if the TSA linked names of 
passengers with images produced using AIT, this would constitute a 
“system of records” that would violate the requirements of the Privacy 
Act, which provides that such records not be kept unless public notice 
is given.56 Yet because EPIC offered no evidence that the TSA in fact 
linked the names of passengers with body scan images, the court dis-
missed the Privacy Act claim.57 
 Nonetheless, EPIC did provide some evidence, contrary to TSA 
public statements that the memory software on all machines had been 
disabled, that thousands of images had been saved and that the ma-
chines had the capability to store and send images when in “test 
mode.”58 The court, however, deemed this evidence insufficient.59 In 
                                                                                                                      
51 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 4. 
52 Id. at 6. 
53 Id. at 4–5. 
54 Id. at 8. 
55 Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (EPIC II ), 653 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
56 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (West 2010); EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 8. 
57 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 8. 
58 David B. Olson, Naked Body Scans and Full-Body Pat-Downs: The Controversy Surrounding 
the TSA’s Enhanced Airport Screening Procedures, in 2011 Aspatore Special Report, Navigat-
ing the Legal Impact of Airport Security Measures: An In-Depth Look at Passen-
ger Profiling and Its Effect on the Public 7 (2011). 
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supporting this conclusion it relied on the 1996 decision by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, Henke v. U.S. Department of 
Commerce.60 In Henke, the Department of Commerce’s Advanced Tech-
nology Program (ATP) stored information about businesses to select 
and award grants for developing high-risk technologies.61 The Henke 
court held that this information did not constitute a “system of records” 
requiring the government to disclose its recordkeeping practices under 
the Privacy Act.62 Specifically, to prove a Privacy Act violation, the court 
required evidence that specific retrieval of personally identifiable in-
formation occurred, not just evidence that retrieval of this information 
from ATP databases was possible.63 Yet in Henke, the court supported its 
conclusion that the records did not violate the Privacy Act by recogniz-
ing that the ATP gives grants to businesses and not individuals.64 
B. Exceptions to the FOIA 
 The FOIA permits public access to any federal government record 
that is not specifically exempt from disclosure.65 The FOIA contains 
exceptions allowing organizations to redact information for a variety of 
reasons.66 For example, an agency can claim a FOIA exception if its 
                                                                                                                      
59 EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 8. 
60 See id. (citing Henke v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1460–61 (D.C. Cir. 
1996)). 
61 Henke, 83 F.3d at 1457. 
62 Id. at 1460–62. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1461–62. 
65 5 U.S.C. § 552 (West 2009); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
(EPIC I ), 760 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10 (D.D.C. 2011). 
66 5 U.S.C. § 552. Matters may be exempt if they are: 
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive or-
der to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and 
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; (2) re-
lated solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) 
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . (7) records or informa-
tion compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could rea-
sonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings . . . (7)(E) 
would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations 
or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investiga-
tions or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law). 
Id. 
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affidavits meet a three-part test.67 In EPIC I, the TSA claimed that it 
could redact information under the (b)(2) exception, for matters re-
lated to the internal personnel rules and practices of the agency, and 
under the (b)(3) exception, which allows matters to be kept secret if 
exempted from disclosure by statute.68 The court held in favor of the 
TSA on the (b)(2) exception and declined to rule on the validity of the 
(b)(3) exception.69 
                                                                                                                     
 At the time of the decision, the (b)(2) exception fell into two main 
categories: “low (b)(2)” material, concerning relatively trivial internal 
agency matters, and “high (b)(2)” material, concerning internal agency 
information that, if disclosed, would risk enabling the requester of the 
information to circumvent the law.70 In EPIC I, the court granted the 
TSA summary judgment, holding that the information could be with-
held from EPIC under a “high (b)(2)” exception.71 
 Less than one year after the decision, however, in 2009, in Milner v. 
Department of the Navy, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the “high 
(b)(2)” exception does not exist and that exceptions to the FOIA 
should be read narrowly.72 Further, the Court recognized that an 
amended version of another exception serves essentially the same pur-
pose, shielding certain information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes if disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumven-
tion of the law.73 As a result, a court would likely allow the TSA to with-
hold or redact the same information from EPIC under that exception 
now that the Supreme Court has condemned the use of the “high 
(b)(2)” exception.74 
 
67 See Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The three-part 
test states that summary judgment for an agency on the basis of its affidavits is appropriate 
if it: 
(a) Describes the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with rea-
sonably specific detail, (b) demonstrates that the information withheld logi-
cally falls within the claimed exemption, and (c) its statements are not con-
troverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency 
bad faith. 
Id. 
68 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 13. 
69 EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 13. 
70 Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1263 (2011). 
71 EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 13, 14. 
72 Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1263. 
73 Id. 
74 See id.; EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 10–13. 
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III. Deference to the Executive Made It Impossible for EPIC to 
Meet Its Burden of Proving Specific Conduct 
A. Deference to the Executive 
 In granting the TSA’s motion for summary judgment, the court 
applied a rule that was highly deferential to the executive branch, al-
lowing the government to meet its “high (b)(2)” burden easily while 
preventing EPIC from obtaining any evidence of specific conduct in 
violation of the Privacy Act.75 In following this rule, the court held that 
it is well established that a court may rely on government affidavits to 
support the withholding of documents under FOIA exceptions and 
that the judiciary owes some measure of deference to the executive in 
cases implicating national security.76 
 Because of that deference, courts often decline to review docu-
ments in camera to determine whether FOIA exceptions apply, instead 
demanding only that the government “articulate a logical basis for clas-
sification.”77 Similarly, the EPIC I court concluded that it must grant 
summary judgment to the TSA if the government’s affidavits met the 
three-part test of a FOIA exception.78 The court held, however, that 
EPIC’s evidence contrary to the TSA’s public statements was not 
enough to destroy this presumption in favor of the TSA.79 As a result, 
because the presumption in favor of the agency is so high and the in-
formation available to the plaintiff is so minimal, courts are not actually 
testing national security claims for reasonableness, good faith, specific-
ity, and plausibility.80 
 Furthermore, the government can always argue that information 
should be withheld under a “mosaic theory.”81 Under that theory, al-
most all tiny pieces of information should be withheld or else they 
might be pieced together to produce an accurate picture of an entire 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (EPIC II ), 653 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (EPIC I ), 760 
F. Supp. 2d 4, 10–13 (D.D.C.), motion for relief from judgment denied, 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
76 EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. 
77 Nathan F. Wessler, Note, “[We] Can Neither Confirm Nor Deny the Existence or Nonexis-
tence of Records Responsive to Your Request”: Reforming the Glomar Response Under FOIA, 85 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1381, 1386 (2010). 
78 EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 10; see supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
79 See EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 10; Olson, supra note 58, at 7. 
80 See EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 10; David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National 
Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L.J. 628, 637 (2005). 
81 See Pozen, supra note 80, at 643–44, 652. 
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agency’s procedures or rules.82 Thus, combined with a mosaic theory 
argument, the presumption in favor of the government could stretch, 
allowing an agency to withhold even the tiniest piece of useful informa-
tion lest it be aggregated and used against the government.83 Moreover, 
because a plaintiff like EPIC does not have access to any of this infor-
mation, it can only insist that the agency’s affidavit in support of sum-
mary judgment does not contain all the arguments required to meet a 
given exemption’s requirements.84 
B. The Court of Appeals’ Requirement of Specific Conduct Ignores EPIC’s 
Previous Attempts to Obtain Information 
 In addition, the EPIC I court required evidence of specific conduct 
to prove a Privacy Act violation, ignoring EPIC’s previous failed at-
tempts to obtain information through the FOIA.85 In EPIC’s original 
FOIA request in April of 2009, it sought numerous records including all 
documents concerning the capability of AIT to obscure, degrade, store, 
transmit, reproduce, retain, or delete images of individuals.86 
 The court in EPIC I, however, deferred to the judgment of the ex-
ecutive branch and allowed the TSA to use a high (b)(2) exception to 
the FOIA to redact and withhold many of the documents sought by 
EPIC, including sample images from the scanners, thereby making it 
impossible for EPIC to prove specific conduct.87 Furthermore, the EPIC 
II court, by requiring evidence of specific conduct to demonstrate a na-
tional security agency’s violation of the Privacy Act, ignored the unrea-
sonably high burden necessary to meet that requirement.88 On the one 
hand, an agency may not simply refuse to acknowledge that it maintains 
a system of records and thereby insulate itself from the reach of the Pri-
                                                                                                                      
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See Justin Cox, Maximizing Information’s Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13 
N.Y. City L. Rev. 387, 410–11 (2010). 
85 See EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 8; EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 8, 10–13. 
86 EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 8 n.2. 
87 See id. at 1013; supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. The high (b)(2) exception 
allows information to be redacted that relates solely to the internal personnel rules and 
practices of an agency that, if disclosed, would risk enabling the requester of the informa-
tion to circumvent the law. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court has since held that a high (b)(2) exception no longer exists, such 
matters can be redacted under exemption (7)(E), which protects information compiled 
for law enforcement purposes if disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circum-
vention of the law. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
88 See EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 8 (citing Henke v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 
1460–61 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
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e.91 
                                                                                                                     
vacy Act.89 On the other hand, due to the exceptions to the FOIA and 
deference to the executive branch upheld by the court in EPIC I, the 
court in EPIC II relied on the TSA’s affidavits to conclude that the TSA 
did not violate the Privacy Act.90 As a result of the presumptions and 
exceptions within the Privacy Act and FOIA, defense agencies may vio-
late the Privacy Act without any opportunity for legal recours
Conclusion 
 EPIC’s case against the TSA demonstrates the nearly impossible 
burden a plaintiff must meet to prove a security agency’s specific con-
duct in violation of the Privacy Act. To prove specific conduct, a plain-
tiff needs to demonstrate specific instances of a government agency’s 
storage of records in violation of the Privacy Act. A plaintiff’s primary 
method to obtain this kind of classified information is through a FOIA 
request, but the exceptions to the FOIA and the presumptions in favor 
of the government in cases implicating national security prevent any 
plaintiff from obtaining this required information. 
 Thus, courts have created a presumption in favor of the govern-
ment, even though the government is the only party with enough in-
formation to tailor its affidavits to the summary judgment standard. In 
addition, courts are hesitant to review these kinds of documents in cam-
era. As a result, the only party with enough information to know about 
Privacy Act violations is the government. Therefore, the court has set a 
precedent allowing security agencies to potentially violate the Privacy 
Act with no realistic opportunity for relief available to aggrieved parties. 
David Gusella 
 
Preferred citation: David Gusella, Comment, Violating Privacy in Private: How Epic v. 
DHS Creates an Impossible Burden on Plaintiffs Trying to Demonstrate a Privacy Act Violation, 53 
B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 169 (2012), http://bclawreview.org/e-supp/2012/14_gusella.pdf. 
 
89 Henke, 83 F.3d at 1461. 
90 See Freedom of Information Act § 552(b), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (West 2009); EPIC II, 653 
F.3d at 8; EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 10–13; Pozen, supra note 80, at 643–44, 652. 
91 See 5 U.S.C. § 552; EPIC II, 653 F.3d at 8; EPIC I, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 10–13; Pozen, su-
pra note 80, at 643–44, 652. 
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